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Abstract
We report on time-varying network connectedness within three banking sys-
tems: North America, the EU, and ASEAN. The original method by Diebold and
Yilmaz is improved by using exponentially weighted daily returns and ridge reg-
ularization on vector autoregression (VAR) and forecast error variance decompo-
sition (FEVD). We compute the total network connectedness for each of the three
banking systems, which quantifies regional uncertainty. Results over rolling win-
dows of 300 days during the period between 2005 and 2015 reveal changing un-
certainty patterns which are similar across regions, with common peaks associated
with identifiable exogenous events. Lead-lag relationships among changes of total
network connectedness of the three systems, quantified by transfer entropy, reveal
that uncertainties in the three regional systems are significantly causally related,
with the North American system having the largest influence on EU and ASEAN.
1 Introduction
Financial markets are increasingly becoming more interconnected (Moghadam and Vinals,
2010), and shocks initially affecting one part of the system can quickly propagate to
the rest of it. Therefore, understanding the patterns of distress propagation within
financial markets is important to characterize systemic risk. After the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis of 2007-2009, significant effort has been devoted into understanding
the mechanics of distress propagation within banking systems. On one hand, a
strand of literature focused on modeling the processes through which contagion
may occur in interbank networks (see for instance Glasserman and Young (2016)
for a recent review). On the other hand, another strand of literature focused on
the quantification of systemic risk from market data (see Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016); Brownlees and Engle (2016)). In particular, Diebold and Yilmaz (2009)
proposed a method based on Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) to
estimate from market data networks of interdependencies between firms, and they
used the connectedness of the estimated networks to quantify spillovers of uncer-
tainty between variables.
In this paper, we use the methodology of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) – that we
improve through the introduction of an exponential weighting of time series and
by coupling it with ridge regression – to estimate the time evolution of connect-
edness in three regional banking systems: North America (NA), Southeast Asia
(ASEAN), and the European Union (EU). Through VAR and FEVD, we compute
the pairwise connectedness between pairs of banks in each region, and we aggre-
gate such pairwise connectedness to compute a measure of total connectedness for
the region.
The time-varying total connectedness computed for each banking system, from
a 300 days rolling window during the period 2005-15, indicates temporal changes
of systemic risk, with peaks during major crisis events and troughs during nor-
mal periods. Analogous results have been observed in other financial systems and
different regions (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009, 2012, 2014; Chau and Deesomsak,
2014; Alter and Beyer, 2014; Fengler and Gisler, 2015; Demirer et al., 2015). It
has to be stressed that, unlike Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) who view all financial
institutions as belonging to one global system, here we group banks into three
regional banking systems. In this way we can perform a comparative analysis
between the different regions, which allows us to highlight similarities and differ-
ences between them. Furthermore, this allow us to quantify the existence of causal
relations between different regions. We must note that combining all the banks
together could be somehow misleading because the banks’ equities in the three
banking systems trade in different stock markets which have significantly different
trading hours.
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The main results of our analysis are as follows: First, we notice that the struc-
ture of the peaks in the three regional banking systems is very similar with large
peaks associated to significant, identifiable major events. Although the overall pat-
terns are similar, we observe two important differences between the systems. The
first is the fact that the overall scale of connectedness is different, with the North-
American banking system being more interconnected than the EU, and this being
in turn more interconnected than the Southeast Asian system. Second, we uncover
the existence of lead-lagged relations between the different time series. To quantify
this effect, we compute the transfer entropy between the time series associated with
changes of connectedness in the different regions, and we uncover the existence
of significant net information flows from North America to the EU, from North-
America to Southeast Asia, and from the EU to Southeast Asia. The robustness of
our finding is tested by using different measures for transfer entropy. In particular
we find consistent results for the net information flow both with a linear measure
of transfer entropy (which corresponds to a Granger causality analysis) as well as
with non-linear measures with different parameters. We also retrieve similar causal
relation for both one day and five days returns. To the best of our knowledge, this
causality study between regional uncertainties is the first of its kind.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a lit-
erature review and place our paper within the context of previous works. In Sec-
tion 3 we describe the used data, while Section 4 provides a brief description of
our methodology. Section 5 illustrates and discusses the main results of the paper,
and finally we present our conclusions in Section 6.
2 Literature review
The literature on spillover effects can be broadly classified into two categories.
The first category comprises network models which aim to describe various causal
mechanics of financial contagion, which can be calibrated with balance-sheet data
(Furfine, 2003; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007; Upper and Worms, 2004; Mu¨ller, 2006;
Cont et al., 2010; Upper, 2011; Birch and Aste, 2014). The second category com-
prises econometric models, which aim at identifying spillover effects exclusively
from market data, without making assumptions about the dynamics of distress
propagation between banks (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; Brownlees and Engle,
2016). Our paper is close to the second strand of literature, as we try to under-
stand whether market data carry information about the level of interconnectedness
between banks, and how exogenous shocks can be amplified by the endogenous
dynamics of financial markets.
Network models of contagion go back to the seminal work of Allen and Gale
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(2000), who showed how the stability of banking system is affected at equilibrium
by the pattern of interconnections between banks, and to the work of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), who showed how to consistently compute a clearing vector of payments in
a network of interbank claims. The relation between the structure of an interbank
network and its stability has been extensively explored also within the context of
non-equilibrium network models (see for instance Furfine (2003), Iori et al. (2006),
Nier et al. (2007), Gai and Kapadia (2010), Cont et al. (2010), Upper (2011), Battiston et al.
(2012), Fricke and Lux (2015), Bardoscia et al. (2015)), showing in particular the
existence of a tension between individual risk and systemic risk – what makes
a bank individually less risky might in fact increase the risk of a systemic fail-
ure (Beale et al., 2011). More recently, these analysis have been extended be-
yond interbank lending networks to the study of networks of overlapping portfolios
(Huang et al., 2013; Caccioli et al., 2014; Corsi et al., 2016). Although these mod-
els have been insightful to understand the dynamics of financial contagion, and
in some cases they have been applied to real data (see Upper (2011) for a review
of existing literature), there are clear challenges to their applicability. First, there
is a lack of reliable data on banks’ balance sheets, which makes it hard to cali-
brate models1. Second, to obtain a reliable assessment of systemic risk one has
to capture all relevant types of interconnections between banks as the interaction
between different contagion channels can significantly change the stability of the
system (Caccioli et al., 2015).
Here we take the complementary approach of inferring interdependencies be-
tween banks from market data, which belongs to the second strand of literature
mentioned above. The advantage of the approach with respect to network modeling
is that market data are readily available, and that different types of interconnections
between banks have already been aggregated by the market. The drawback is that
this approach does not provide an explanation of how stress propagates between
banks, and that it relies on the underlying assumption of market efficiency, which
is not realistic (Shiller, 2003). Nevertheless, one can assume that, although mar-
kets are not efficient, prices do reflect to some extent the aggregate information (or
expectations) about the underlying assets. There have been several contributions to
this strand of the literature. In particular, Dungey et al. (2005) provide a summary
of empirical models of contagion up to 2005. More recent empirical work includes
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014), Caceres et al. (2010), Billio et al. (2012),
Claeys and Vasicek (2014), Lucas et al. (2014), and Brownlees and Engle (2016).
Of particular relevance for our paper is the work of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009,
1Admati et al. (2013) report that banks tend to find ways to get around regulations in order to
invest in mortgage-backed securities and derivatives via structured-investment vehicles which are off
balance sheet items. Such leeway allowed by regulations creates regulatory boundaries, making it
difficult for outsiders to know what banks actually report.
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2012, 2014) which influenced subsequent studies such as McMillan and Speight
(2010), Buba´k et al. (2011), Fujiwara and Takahashi (2012), Klo¨ßner and Wagner
(2014), Alter and Beyer (2014), Chau and Deesomsak (2014), Demirer et al. (2015),
and Fengler and Gisler (2015). This strand of contributions uses vector autore-
gression (VAR) and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) to quantify
unpredictability of each of the variables in the network. By using the VAR and
FEVDmethods it is possible to disentangle the contribution to unpredictability due
to endogenous interdependencies from that due to exogenous shocks. Following
Diebold and Yilmaz, we will refer to this endogenous component in this paper as
total network connectedness, which therefore quantifies the transmission of shocks
from banks within the system.
3 Data
We collect daily stock prices between January 2005 and October 2015 of banks
headquartered in North America (US and Canada), the European Union (EU), and
Southeast Asia (ASEAN) from Compustat database. We select only the financial
institutions in the sub-industry “Banks,” i.e., those having GICS code 40101010
and compute log returns from the daily closing prices for each bank. Our sam-
ple includes 10 publicly listed banks in North America, 66 banks in the European
Union (EU), and 39 banks in Southeast Asia (ASEAN). All banks in the North
American banking system have their stocks traded in the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), while the EU and ASEAN bank stocks mostly trade in their own
national stock markets. Appendix A provides lists of banks in all three regions as
well as their summary statistics. The data were analyzed over rolling windows of
300 days and over the full period.
4 Methodology
4.1 Total Connectedness
Following the approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014)
we use a variance decomposition where the forecast error variance of a variable
is decomposed into contributions attributed to each variable in the system. The
approach is based on the vector autoregression (VAR) model, introduced by Sims
(1980) (see Stock and Watson (2001); Cochrane (2005); Lutkepohl (2006); Tsay
(2010) for discussions, reviews and applications).
VAR estimates the value of a sets of N variables yt,1, ...yt,N at time t from a
linear combination of their values in the past by performing a multi-dimensional
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regression. By using the vectorial representation Yt = (yt,1, ...yt,N)T and consid-
ering the t−1 lag only, the regression can be written as: Yt =AYt−1+ǫt withA an
N ×N matrix of coefficients. By iterating this formula and expressing it in terms
of an orthonormal basis of residuals wi,t (with var(wi,twj,t) = δi,j) (Cochrane,
2005), one can write:
yi,t =
∞
∑
s=0
N
∑
j=1
θij,swj,t−s . (1)
The one-step ahead forecast is Yˆt+1 = AYt. The forecast error is the difference
yi,t+1 − yˆi,t+1 = θij,0wj,t+1 and its variance is therefore:
var(yi,t+1 − yˆi,t+1) =
N
∑
j,k=1
θij,0θik,0var(wj,t+1,wk,t+1) =
N
∑
j=1
θ2ij,0 . (2)
Each term θ2ij,0 in the sum is interpreted as the contribution to the one-step fore-
cast error variance of variable i due to shocks in variable j. Its normalized value,
cij = θ2ij,0/∑
N
k=1 θ
2
ik,0, is called connectedness by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012,
2014) and it is associated with the relative uncertainty spillover from variable j to
variable i. In this paper we will report about the ‘total connectedness’, which is
total connectedness =
1
N
N
∑
i,j=1
i/=j
cij (3)
and measures the average effect that the variables have on the one-step forecast
error variance. It is a measure of spillover uncertainty within the entire system.
Larger values of total connectedness correspond to unstable periods with strong
influences of the variables uncertainties on each other.
We refine the original Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014) methodology
by introducing two technical improvements. The first improvement consists in the
use of ridge regularized VAR (Tikhonov, 1963; Hoerl and Kennard, 1970), which
is used to make estimations less sensitive to noise and uncertainty associated with
the finite length of time series. Ridge regression introduces a penalty on the square
sum of regression coefficients, thus favoring models with smaller coefficients. This
improves regression performances especially for systems with a large number of
variables where the covariance matrix is nearly singular (see Gruber (1998) ). In
practice, ridge regression consists in adding a diagonal term in the expression for
the regression coefficients: B = (XX ′ + λI)−1XY ′ with I the identity matrix
and λ a coefficient that makes the inversion less sensitive to uncertainty over small
eigenvalues (Tikhonov, 1963). The parameter λ must be chosen with respect to
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regression performances, it depends on the length of the time series and on their
statistical properties. In our case, we used λ = 100 which we verified being a good
compromise value for this dataset and window length 300 points. We verified that
results are little sensitive to variations of λ in a wide range [100−1000]. The second
technical improvement consists in the use of exponential smoothing to mitigate
the effects associated with sensitiveness to large variations in remote observations,
Pozzi et al. (2012). Exponential smoothing computes weighted averages over the
observation window with exponentially decreasing weights, exp(−s/θ), assigned
to more remote observations (here s counts the number of points from the present).
In this paper we use rolling windows of size 300 days with exponential weights
with characteristic length θ = 100. The choice of characteristic length equal to a
third of windows length was suggested as optimal by Pozzi et al. (2012).
4.2 Transfer entropy and Granger causality
We investigate how uncertainty in one region affects uncertainty in another
region by quantifying lead-lag relationships among uncertainty spillovers. To this
purpose we compute the transfer entropy associated with the daily and weekly
changes in the total connectedness of the three systems.
In this paper we estimate the transfer entropy by using both linear and non-
linear approaches. The transfer entropy TY→X quantifies the reduction of uncer-
tainty on the variable X that is provided by the knowledge of the past of the vari-
able Y taking in consideration the information from the past of X. In terms of
conditional entropies it can be written as:
TY→X =H(Xt∣Xt−lag) −H(Xt∣Xt−lag , Yt−lag) (4)
where Xt represents the present of variable X and Xt−lag its lagged past. In this
paper we report results for one-day lag. The conditional entropies are defined as
H(A∣B) = H(A,B) −H(B) with H(A,B) the joint entropy of variables A and
B and H(B) the entropy of variable B.
For what concerns the computation of these entropies, the linear approach is
the standard procedure. It quantifies the additional reduction in the variance of
a variable Y provided by the past of variable X and it is directly related with
Granger causality (Granger (1988); Barnett et al. (2009)). In this linear case, the
entropy associated with a set of variables Z is proportional to the log determinant
of the covariance: H(Z) = 1
2
log det(2eπΣ(Z)), where Σ(Z) is the covariance
matrix of the variables in Z . By using Eq.4 it results that TY→X is simply given by
half the logarithm of the ratio between the regression error of variable X regressed
with respect toXt−lag and the regression error of variable X regressed with respect
to both Xt−lag and Yt−lag . The non-linear approach estimates instead entropies by
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first discretizing the signal into three states, associated with a central band of values
within δ standard deviations from the mean and two external bands respectively
with values smaller or larger than the central band. By calling p0A, p
−
A and p
+
A the
relative frequencies of the observations in the three bands, entropy is estimated as
H(A) = −p−A log p
−
A − p
0
A log p
0
A − p
+
A log p
+
A. The joint entropies are equivalently
defined by the joint combination of values of the variables in the 3 bands and the
transfer entropy is retrieved by applying Eq.4.
The information flow can be measured by comparing transfer entropies in the
two directions. If TY→X > TX→Y , then one can say that the direction of the in-
formation goes prevalently from Y to X; conversely, if TX→Y > TY→X , then the
direction of the information goes prevalently from X to Y . The net information
flow between X and Y can be quantified as TX→Y − TY→X .
We validated the statistical significance of transfer entropy by comparing our
results with the null hypothesis generated by computing 10,000 values of the trans-
fer entropy obtained by randomizing the order of the lagged variables. This pro-
vides a non-parametric null hypothesis from which p-values can be computed. We
also compared this non-parametric p-value estimates with the one from F-statistics
in the linear case and found comparable results.
5 Results
5.1 Total connectedness
We compute the total connectedness of the three banking systems – North
America, EU and ASEAN – over a rolling window of 300 days for the ten years pe-
riod between January 2006 and January 2016. Figures 1, 2, and 3 report the results
for each of the three systems comparing the original approach of Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009) (in dashed red line) with the improved approach proposed in this paper
(solid blue line). Let us first observe that the total connectedness from the two
approaches have similar values and comparable behavior. We can observe that the
use of ridge regularized VAR eliminates some outlying spurious peaks observed
with the original method. For instance, this is particularly evident in Fig.2 for the
peak after January 2011, but the effect is present in all samples across the three
regions and periods. More evident is the effect of exponential smoothing, which
makes peaks sharper and eliminates the plateau effect due to the persistence of the
influence of a peak during the whole length of the rolling window. For instance,
this is especially evident in Fig.1 where in the standard VAR method the peak in
total connectedness observed just after January 2009 persists creating a plateau
that drops abruptly after 300 days in January 2010. Conversely the exponential
weighted ridge regularized method reveal a clear peak reaching maximum around
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January 2009 followed by a sharp decrease. We observe that the plateau effects
in standard VAR-equal-weights method sometimes hide completely peaks that are
instead detected with the exponentially weighted ridge regularized method; this is
for instance the case for the late 2010 North-America spillover peak visible in Fig.3
only in the exponentially weighted ridge regularized method.
Let us note that in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), where total connectedness in
equity index returns and equity index return volatilities were measured, they found
that the return spillovers demonstrate “a gently increasing trend but no bursts,
whereas volatility spillovers display no trend but clear bursts.” Our results in Fig-
ures 1, 2, and 3 indicate that applying exponential weights onto the returns allow
us to observe both trends and bursts in the return uncertainty spillovers.
Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
Total spillover: ASEAN
equal weights, standard VAR
exponential weights, ridge regularized VAR
Figure 1. ASEAN banking system: Comparison between total connectedness
computed with classical VAR approach (dashed red line) and the proposed ap-
proach (solid blue line) with ridge penalization and exponential smoothing. Com-
putations are over 300-day rolling window.
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Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
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0.65
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0.8
Total spillover: EU
equal weights, standard VAR
exponential weights, ridge regularized VAR
Figure 2. EU banking system: Comparison between total connectedness computed
with classical VAR approach (dashed red line) and the proposed approach (solid
blue line) with ridge penalization and exponential smoothing. Computations are
over 300-day rolling window.
Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8 Total spillover: North America
equal weights, standard VAR
exponential weights, ridge regularized VAR
Figure 3. North American banking system: Comparison between total connected-
ness computed with classical VAR approach (dashed red line) and the proposed ap-
proach (solid blue line) with ridge penalization and exponential smoothing. Com-
putations are over 300-day rolling window.
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A comparison between ASEAN, EU, and North American total connected-
ness from the ridge regularized VAR models is presented in Figure 4, where major
events are labeled on the graph when they occurred. We observe that the general
shapes of the total connectedness of the three banking systems appear to be simi-
lar. Over the 10-year period from 2006 to 2015, the values of the North American
total connectedness are generally higher than those of the EU and ASEAN bank-
ing systems with the exceptions in 2006 to mid 2007, early 2011, early 2013 and
mid 2014. From visual inspection of Figure 4, we notice that variations in total
connectedness of the North American banking system seems to lead those of the
EU and ASEAN systems and total connectedness of the EU system seems to lead
that of the ASEAN system. This prompts us to perform causality tests on the total
connectedness time series of the three banking systems in order to investigate how
systemic uncertainty in each region influences the others and the lead-lag relation-
ships among them.
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Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Jan-09
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9 1
Subprime mortgage crisisSecuritization market close down
Global stock market sharp fall
US near-record deficit $410 billion
Nationalization of Northern Rock
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac rescue
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
Rescue of RBS, Lloyds, and HBOS
IMF approved $2.1 bn loan for Iceland
US govt gave Bank of America $20 bn aid
RBS reported £2.1 bn loss
12.5% economic contraction in Japan
US credit downgrade from A+ to ALIBOR scandal
City of Detroit bankruptcyUkranian/Syrian/Egypt unrest
Ebola epidemic
EU sovereign debt crisis
Subprim
e crisis
G
lobal Financial Crisis
ASEAN spillover
EU spillover
N
orth Am
erican spillover
G
lobal Financial Crisis
European sovereign debt crisis
Subprim
e
crisis
Figure4.Totalconnectednessinthethreebankingsystems(asinFigs.1,2and
3,solidlines).Majoreventsassociatedwithpeaksareindicatedinthefigure.
Computationsareover300-dayrollingwindow.
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5.2 Causality tests on regional total connectedness
In order to quantify the lead-lag relationships among the North American (NA),
EU, and ASEAN (AS) total connectedness we compute transfer entropy and infor-
mation flow between the daily changes of total connectedness in the three regions
for one-day lag. Results are reported in Tab.1. Transfer entropies are estimated us-
ing both linear and non-linear approaches discussed in section 4.2. We recall that
the linear measure is equivalent to Granger causality, where a significant trans-
fer entropy corresponds to a validated Granger causality relation. The non-linear
measure are computed for fluctuation bands at δ = 1,2,3 standard deviations (see
section 4.2). One can observe that there is a significant information transfer be-
tween NA and EU, NA and AS and EU and AS, that for the linear case, implies
NA Granger causes EU, NA Granger causes AS and EU Granger cause AS. We
observe that the non-linear estimation gives consistent results with the linear esti-
mate for all values of δ, demonstrating robustness of the result. We also observe
that there are significant causal relations also in the opposite directions. Given the
extended time-lags between the three regions it is fair to question whether one-day
time lag and one-day time horizon will affect asymmetrically markets depending
on their relative opening hours. We therefore test the flow of information across
regions for time-horizon and lag of 5 days instead of one day. The results for the
transfer entropies and information flow, performed for the entire period on non-
overlapping 5-day returns, are reported in Tab. 2. We observe that results are
consistent with the ones for one-day time horizon and lag reported in Tab. 1 with
the main difference being the lower statistical significance. This is expected be-
cause the time series for the 5-day changes are five times shorter than the ones for
daily changes.
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Table 1. Quantification of transfer entropy between regional total connectedness:
March 28, 2006-November 2, 2015 (full sample). From daily changes in the total
connectivity using one day lag.
method TENA→EU TEEU→NA Net Information Flow
linear 0.004722∗∗ 0.001354∗ 0.003369
non-linear treshold σ 0.005251∗∗∗ 0.006711∗∗ -0.001460
non-linear treshold 2σ 0.003980∗∗∗ 0.002012∗ 0.001968
non-linear treshold 3σ 0.004939∗∗∗ 0.000561 0.004378
method TENA→AS TEAS→NA Net Information Flow
linear 0.017336∗∗∗ 0.008931∗∗∗ 0.008405
non-linear treshold σ 0.008789∗∗∗ 0.005837∗∗ 0.002953
non-linear treshold 2σ 0.005348∗∗∗ 0.002305∗ 0.003042
non-linear treshold 3σ 0.003150∗∗ 0.002803∗∗∗ 0.000348
method TEEU→AS TEAS→EU Net Information Flow
linear 0.005659∗∗ 0.003633∗∗ 0.002026
non-linear treshold σ 0.005553∗∗ 0.001262 0.004291
non-linear treshold 2σ 00.005960∗∗∗ 0.000228 0.005732
non-linear treshold 3σ 0.004238∗∗∗ 0.002118∗∗∗ 0.002120
* p-value < 0.05, ** p-value < 0.01, *** p-value < 0.001.
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Table 2. Quantification of transfer entropy between regional total connectedness:
March 28, 2006-November 2, 2015 (full sample). From weekly changes (5 days)
in the total connectivity using five days lag.
method TENA→EU TEEU→NA Net Information Flow
linear 0.008003∗ 0.001255 0.006747
non-linear treshold σ 0.009204 0.009474 -0.000271
non-linear treshold 2σ 0.017228∗∗∗ 0.003196 0.014032
non-linear treshold 3σ 0.024087∗∗∗ 0.002335∗ 0.021752
method TENA→AS TEAS→NA Net Information Flow
linear 0.017200∗∗ 0.003703 0.013497
non-linear treshold σ 0.010598∗ 0.004354 0.006244
non-linear treshold 2σ 0.006509 0.006475 0.000034
non-linear treshold 3σ 0.002107 0.006805∗∗∗ -0.004698
method TEEU→AS TEAS→EU Net Information Flow
linear 0.022020∗∗ 0.000619 0.021401
non-linear treshold σ 0.021641∗∗∗ 0.002374 0.019267
non-linear treshold 2σ 0.022964∗∗∗ 0.002900 0.020063
non-linear treshold 3σ 0.007488∗∗ 0.000405 0.007083
* p-value < 0.05, ** p-value < 0.01, *** p-value < 0.001.
6 Conclusion
We investigate regional and inter-regional uncertainty spillovers in the North
American, EU, and ASEAN banking systems during a period characterized by
great regional and global financial stress (2005-2015). Uncertainty and financial
instability is quantified by means of total network connectedness, that we mea-
sure improving the method of Diebold and Yilmaz. We demonstrate that expo-
nential smoothing and ridge regression provide better defined peaks in the tempo-
ral analysis and avoid the occurrence some spurious peaks. We observe that the
North-American system appears to be consistently more interconnected than the
EU, which in turn is more interconnected than the ASEAN network. Similarly to
previous analysis of Diebold an Yilmaz on other systems, our empirical analysis
of the North-American, ASEAN and EU banking networks shows that increased
connectivity corresponds to periods of higher distress in the system. We observe
that all large peaks of total network connectedness are associate with identifiable
major exogenous events. Despite some of these events being related to specific
regions, the effects are seen similarly across the three banking systems, which re-
veal similar patterns of peaks and troughs in the variations of their total network
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connectedness. However, such variations are not perfectly synchronous across the
regions, and causality patterns are discovered by using transfer entropy. The analy-
sis reveals that the North American banking system is the most influential, causing
the largest effects on the other systems. However, feedback effects are measured
with significant causal relations also in the opposite directions. The results are
demonstrated to be robust with respect to changes in the method used to compute
the transfer entropy, changes in the values of parameters, and with respect to the
use of daily or weekly returns in the analysis.
To summarize, the contribution of this paper is three folds. First, we improve
technical aspect of the VAR estimation, allowing for better identification of events
concentrated at specific times, which leads to more accurate and insightful interpre-
tation of the results. Second, we focus on connectedness in banking sector, while
previous studies based on the Diebold and Yilmaz methodology analyzed networks
of financial institutions. In particular, we analyze the North American, EU and
ASEAN banking systems individually and show that, despite the regions’ geo-
graphical distances, they are affected in various degrees by major financial crisis
events originated in dominant regions such as the North American and EU banking
systems. Third, we originally perform a causality analysis on the regional con-
nectedness time series generated through the Diebold and Yilmaz’s method. Our
analysis suggests that a regional disaggregated investigation has the advantage of
introducing a predictive component to this methodology. While the network total
connectedness measure identifies increase in regional uncertainty associated with
major events that shake the markets, the causality relation between total connect-
edness in different regions, introduced in this paper, provides a quantitative charac-
terization of the flow of uncertainty form region to region, that could be interpreted
as the result of contagion. To the best of our knowledge, this causality analysis is
the first of its kind.
As future directions we will compare this approach with with other information
theoretic measures with the aim to find a framework that is capable to qualify
financial uncertainty and its causal effects at all levels of aggregation, from a local
single-variable perspective to the global world-market view.
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A List and summary statistics of banks in the sample
Table 3. List of banks that are headquartered in North America (Canada and the
U.S.) and have actively traded between 2005-2015
Bank name Country Daily mean return (%) Daily volatility (%)
1. Canadian Imperial Bank (CIBC) CAN 0.01 1.82
2. Bank of Montreal (BMO) CAN 0.01 1.69
3. Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) CAN 0.03 1.73
4. Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) CAN 0.03 1.65
5. Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) CAN 0.01 1.72
6. Citigroup (CITI) USA -0.08 3.70
7. Bank of America Corp (BAC) USA -0.04 3.51
8. Wells Fargo & Co (WFC) USA 0.02 2.86
9. JP Morgan Chase & Co (JPM) USA 0.02 2.64
10. US Bancorp (USB) USA 0.01 2.32
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Table 4. List of banks that are headquartered in Southeast Asia and have actively
traded between 2005-2015.
Bank Country
Market cap
($ billion)
Average
return (%)
Volatility
(%)
1 Bank Rakyat Indonesia IDN 20.43 0.07 2.56
2 Bank Permata IDN 0.54 0.02 1.93
3 Bank Danamon IDN 2.23 0.00 2.73
4 Bank Maybank Indonesia IDN 0.79 0.00 2.67
5 Bank Cimb Niaga IDN 1.07 0.02 2.51
6 Panin Bank IDN 0.17 0.03 2.68
7 Bank Negara Indonesia IDN 6.66 0.04 2.50
8 Bank Central Asia IDN 23.21 0.08 2.06
9 Bank Mandiri IDN 15.75 0.05 2.54
10 Public Bank MYS 16.15 0.04 0.90
11 Malayan Banking MYS 18.70 0.00 1.23
12 RHB Capital MYS 3.73 0.03 1.58
13 AMMB Holdings MYS 3.04 0.01 1.51
14 AFFIN Holdings MYS 0.97 0.01 1.65
15 Alliance Financial Group MYS 1.15 0.01 1.52
16 BIMB Holdings MYS 1.35 0.03 2.13
17 CIMB Group Holdings MYS 7.92 0.02 1.54
18 Hong Leong Bank MYS 6.17 0.03 1.14
19 Philippine National Bank PHL 1.20 0.03 2.39
20 Bank of Philippine Islands PHL 6.97 0.03 1.79
21 China Banking Corp PHL 1.36 0.04 1.39
22 Metropolitan Bank and Trust PHL 4.67 0.05 2.12
23 Security Bank Corp PHL 1.86 0.07 1.87
24 Rizal Commercial Bank Corp PHL 0.94 0.03 2.19
25 Union Bank PHL 1.22 0.05 1.77
26 BDO Unibank PHL 7.33 0.05 2.04
27 United Overseas Bank SGP 19.62 0.01 1.49
28 DBS Group Holdings SGP 25.23 0.01 1.49
29 Oversea-Chinese Banking SGP 22.71 0.02 1.33
30 Krung Thai Bank THA 6.79 0.02 2.11
31 Siam Commercial Bank THA 11.44 0.03 2.02
32 Bangkok Bank THA 8.04 0.02 1.81
33 Bank of Ayudhya THA 6.15 0.03 2.41
34 Kasikornbank THA 10.94 0.04 1.97
35 TMB Bank THA 3.12 -0.01 2.40
36 Kiatnakin Bank THA 0.91 0.00 1.94
37 Tisco Financial Group THA 0.96 0.02 2.11
38 Thanachart Capital THA 14.3 0.03 2.13
39 CIMB Thai Bank THA 0.76 -0.01 2.75
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Table 5. List of banks that are headquartered in the EU and have actively traded
between 2005-2015 (1).
Bank Country Daily return (%) Volatility (%)
1 Oberbank Ag AUT 0.02 0.38
2 Erste Group Bk Ag AUT -0.01 2.95
3 KBC Group Nv BEL 0.00 3.50
4 Dexia Sa BEL -0.21 7.76
5 Hellenic Bank CYP -0.08 3.08
6 Komercni Banka As CZE 0.01 2.10
7 IKB Deutsche Industriebank DEU -0.13 3.90
8 Commerzbank DEU -0.08 3.09
9 DVB Bank Ag DEU 0.03 1.38
10 HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt DEU 0.00 1.73
11 Comdirect Bank Ag DEU 0.02 1.83
12 Deutsche Postbank Ag DEU 0.00 2.15
13 Danske Bank As DNK 0.01 2.11
14 Jyske Bank DNK 0.02 1.94
15 Nordea Invest Fjernosten DNK 0.01 1.43
16 Sydbank As DNK 0.03 1.93
17 Banco Santander Sa ESP 0.00 2.16
18 BBVA ESP -0.01 2.12
19 Banco Popular Espanol ESP -0.07 2.30
20 Bankinter ESP 0.01 2.28
21 Banco De Sabadell Sa ESP -0.02 1.89
22 BNP Paribas FRA 0.00 2.56
23 Natixis FRA -0.01 3.12
24 Societe Generale Group FRA -0.02 2.86
25 Credit Agricole Sa FRA -0.02 2.78
26 CIC (Credit Industriel Comm) FRA 0.00 1.41
27 Barclays Plc GBR -0.03 3.23
28 HSBC Hldgs Plc GBR -0.02 1.72
29 Royal Bank of Scotland Group GBR -0.10 3.91
30 Standard Chartered Plc GBR 0.00 2.44
31 Lloyds Banking Group Plc GBR -0.05 3.37
32 Piraeus Bank Sa GRC -0.22 5.04
33 Attica Bank Sa GRC -0.23 5.88
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Table 6. (cont.) List of banks that are headquartered in the EU and have actively
traded between 2005-2015 (2).
Bank Country Daily return (%) Volatility (%)
34 Eurobank Ergasias Sa GRC -0.31 5.52
35 National Bank of Greece GRC -0.20 4.81
36 Alpha Bank Sa GRC -0.15 4.69
37 Zagrebacka Banka HRV 0.00 2.58
38 Privredna Banka Zagreb Dd HRV 0.01 2.37
39 OTP Bank Plc HUN 0.00 2.63
40 Unicredit Spa ITA -0.05 2.90
41 Credito Emiliano Spa ITA 0.00 2.26
42 Intesa Sanpaolo Spa ITA 0.00 2.61
43 Banca Popolare Di Sondrio ITA -0.01 1.83
44 Banca Carige Spa Gen & Imper ITA -0.10 2.39
45 Banco Desio Della Brianza ITA -0.02 1.76
46 Banco Popolare ITA -0.06 2.86
47 Banca Popolare Di Milano ITA -0.03 2.78
48 Banca Monte Dei Paschi Siena ITA -0.12 2.96
49 Bank of Siauliai Ab LTU -0.06 2.97
50 ING Groep Nv NLD -0.01 3.14
51 Van Lanschot Nv NLD -0.03 1.62
52 Mbank Sa POL 0.05 2.34
53 Bank Handlowy W Warzawie Sa POL 0.01 2.05
54 ING Bank Slaski Sa POL 0.04 1.90
55 Bank BPH S.A. POL -0.09 4.48
56 Bank Millennium Sa POL 0.03 2.62
57 Bank Plsk Kasa Opk Grp Pekao POL 0.00 2.26
58 Bank Zachodni Wbk Sa POL 0.04 2.15
59 Getin Holding Sa POL -0.02 3.16
60 Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci POL 0.00 2.02
61 Banco BPI Sa PRT -0.03 2.46
62 Banco Comercial Portugues Sa PRT -0.09 2.76
63 Svenska Handelsbanken SWE 0.02 1.86
64 Skandinaviska Enskilda Bank SWE 0.01 2.55
65 Nordea Bank Ab SWE 0.02 2.05
66 Swedbank Ab SWE 0.01 2.53
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